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26 April 1963


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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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USSR-Laos: (Moscow's tactics in blocking action by the Geneva co-chairmen to ease tensions in Laos apparently stem primarily from the Soviet leaders' desire to avoid complicating their problem in dealing with the Chinese Communists at this juncture in the Sino-Soviet conflict.)

(Ambassador Kohler suggests that the fighting between the Pathet Lao and Kong Le forces has confronted the USSR with the sort of decision it wishes to avoid during this period of exchanges with Peiping regarding bilateral negotiations. He also feels that Moscow has been embarrassed by Pathet Lao aggressiveness and has been forced into a position of covering up for Pathet Lao policy which it does not fully approve.)

(Kohler doubts that the USSR can exert sufficient pressure on the Pathet Lao to permit a return to the status quo ante and stabilization of the situation in the Plaine des Jarres.)

(Despite Moscow's uncooperative attitude and its charges that the US is sabotaging the Geneva agreements of 1962, it is unlikely that the Soviet leaders have decided to reverse their policy in Laos and seek to destroy Premier Souvanna's coalition government. They probably see considerable advantages in maintaining the Geneva facade and prefer tactics of gradual erosion of neutralist strength which avoid the risks of escalation of the fighting and a great power confrontation in Laos.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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India-Pakistan: (A solution of the Kashmir problem appears as remote as ever following the fifth round of Indo-Pakistani negotiations.)

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(Virtually no substantive progress was made during the talks in Karachi concluded on 25 April. The two delegations agreed to meet for a sixth round in New Delhi on 15 May. Neither side wants to bear the onus for breaking off the negotiations, and each prefers to delay any major move until after Secretary Rusk's visit to the subcontinent from 29 April to 3 May.)

(New Delhi's attitude has hardened during the past week. Although Indian leaders would like to keep the dialogue going, they apparently still feel that a settlement of the dispute and better relations with Pakistan are not worth the price of major territorial concessions in Kashmir.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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British Guiana: (No settlement of the general strike--now in its sixth day--is yet in sight, and there is still a possibility that serious violence may break out.)

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
(Premier Jagan and the Trades Union Council (TUC) are continuing to negotiate on the government's controversial labor relations bill, which caused the strike. The bill was passed by the lower house of the legislature on 22 April. Senate action on the bill is scheduled for 30 April, and its passage and subsequent endorsement by the colonial governor are likely. Jagan has canceled his plans to visit the US and Canada.)

(The TUC apparently intends to attempt to continue the strike for at least two weeks. However, its strike funds are short, and support for the strike by its largest affiliate, the Manpower Citizens Association, whose rank and file is pro-Jagan, is not solid. Spontaneous violence could well up when strike funds run out. If the strike begins to collapse, the TUC leaders might resort to violent demonstrations against Jagan.)

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(In the event of a violent outbreak, London would probably feel obliged to use the 600 troops it has in the colony to uphold legal government. The expectation that this would be the case might cause government supporters to start trouble deliberately. London has already alerted reinforcements.)

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Somali Republic: The Somali Government appears to be preparing to expand its relations with Communist China and the Soviet bloc.

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(Prime Minister Abdirascid has accepted an invitation to visit Peiping within the next few months, probably in large part because he believes that Western sources will not furnish the quantity of arms that the Somalis want in order to pursue their border disputes with Ethiopia and Kenya. A US military survey team has been in Somalia, and intermittent discussions of Somali arms requests are being held with Italy and West Germany as well.)

(The Chinese Communists will almost certainly offer small arms and training personnel to the Somalis, as they have before, but Abdirascid probably will try to delay accepting until after the West has made its offer. The USSR probably has not gone beyond generalized offers of arms aid.)

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President Aden, meanwhile, has accepted in principle an invitation to visit Bulgaria. A Somali parliamentary delegation returned last week from Bulgaria and the USSR, impressed with the red-carpet treatment it received, and the Somali cabinet has granted Aeroflot's request for landing rights at Mogadiscio.

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NOTES

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West Germany: (Bundestag President Gerstenmaier has stated he will call off the plenary session of the Bundestag in Berlin, which he originally planned to convene during the 20-22 May period. Gerstenmaier told UK Ambassador Roberts on 24 April that he could understand Allied objections that a session would be unnecessarily irritating to the Soviet Union. He said he anticipates that pressure would arise again next October for a Bundestag meeting in Berlin.)

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Turkey: At least a limited purge of potentially dissident officers may be under way in the Turkish armed forces. A number of army and navy personnel, one of whom was associated with the abortive coup of 22 February 1962, have been arrested. However, the leader of the coup attempt last year--who is also said to be a key figure in current plotting--has sent word to the US Embassy that none of his present group is involved, although other officers in the Ankara area have been implicated in plotting.

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